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Standard models of tax e⁄ects on international investment assume that investing
abroad has no direct impact on the pro￿tability of domestic activities of the invest-
ing ￿rm.1 However, there is extensive empirical evidence that investing abroad,
be it green￿eld investment or mergers and acquisition (m&a), strongly in￿ uences
the pro￿tability, productivity, employment etc. of the investor ￿rm. In this paper,
we present a simple model which allows for such feedback e⁄ects of foreign direct
investment on domestic activity. We ￿nd that, in the presence of feedback e⁄ects,
corporate taxes distort the quality, not just the quantity, of foreign direct invest-
ment. High tax countries are likely to attract investment projects which yield
low pro￿ts in the host country and contribute little to its corporate tax revenue
whereas low tax countries can expect the opposite. We call this the composition
e⁄ect of corporate taxation on foreign direct investment.
We provide empirical evidence supporting the main prediction of our model
with regard to tax revenues. We ￿nd that the contribution of foreign direct invest-
ment to tax revenue is positive for low tax countries but declines with increasing
tax rates. If the e⁄ective average tax rate exceeds approximately 30 per cent, an
increase in foreign direct investment reduces corporate tax revenue.
In the literature, the observation that pro￿tability tends to be lower in high tax
countries is usually interpreted as re￿ ecting that ￿rms shift book pro￿ts to low tax
countries.2 This paper o⁄ers a complementary explanation for tax driven di⁄er-
ences in pro￿tability. Our analysis suggests that existing studies may overestimate
the importance of pro￿t shifting. This may have important policy implications.
We discuss this issue further in section 5.
In research on international taxation, feedback e⁄ects of foreign investment
on the investor ￿rm have been neglected completely. In contrast, the literature
on multinational ￿rms recognizes their importance and points out that synergies
between di⁄erent ￿rms of a multinational group and complementarities of their
assets are an important factor for the formation and the existence of these ￿rms.3
1See the surveys in Hau￿ er (2001), Wilson & Wildasin (2004), Fuest, Huber & Mintz (2005)
and Devereux (2006).
2See e.g. Grubert & Mutti (1991), Hines & Rice (1994) and the studies cited in section 5.
3See e.g. the introduction to the theory of multinational ￿rms in Markusen (2002), ch. 1.
1We de￿ne synergies as an increase in pro￿ts for the whole group caused by border-
crossing investment. A multinational group will realize an investment project if
the after tax pro￿t change for the whole group is at least as high as the cost of
capital. The ￿rm is indi⁄erent about where these pro￿ts are generated, in the
headquarter or in the new production plant. But, from a national tax policy
perspective, the distribution of pro￿ts across subsidiaries of the multinational ￿rm
located in di⁄erent countries is of key importance. It is the purpose of this paper
to analyze the e⁄ect of taxes on cross-border investment when the pro￿t change is
not restricted to occur in the country of the initial investment.
In principle, there are three possible ways in which a foreign investment project
may change the distribution of pro￿ts within the multinational group. Firstly,
the investment may not a⁄ect the pro￿t generated by the parent company in
its country of residence, as usually assumed in standard models of international
investment. In this case, the marginal investment project has a return equal to
the cost of capital. Secondly, the transaction may reduce the pro￿ts of the parent
company. This may happen, for instance, if a plant built abroad produces a good
which competes with a good produced by the parent company. In this case, the
project will only be undertaken if it increases the pro￿tability of the subsidiary
by more than the cost of capital. Thirdly, the investment project may increase
the pro￿ts of the parent company. A possible reason could be that the subsidiary
provides market access or speci￿c know how to the parent company. In this case,
the marginal investment project may imply that pro￿ts in the subsidiary are very
low or even negative because the higher pro￿ts of the parent company make the
investment worthwhile.
Recent evidence shows that investment abroad has a signi￿cant impact on all
types of performance indicators of the parent company, independent of whether
investment takes the form of green￿eld projects or m&a. Desai, Foley & Hines
(2005a) ￿nd that investment abroad increases the aggregate domestic investment
activity by US multinationals. Desai, Foley & Hines (2005b) use ￿rm-level data of
US multinationals and show that foreign investment in plant, property and equip-
ment (PPE) is associated with higher domestic PPE investment. Similarly, Egger
& Pfa⁄ermayer (2003) ￿nd that foreign investment increases domestic investment
in tangible assets and does not decrease investment in intangibles. Castellani &
2Barba Navaretti (2004) and Jaeckle (2006) show that going abroad increases do-
mestic productivity and competitiveness. In addition, there are several empirical
studies, surveyed by Andrade, Mitchell & Sta⁄ord (2001), analyzing the e⁄ects of
m&a on the investor ￿rm￿ s performance. There is empirical evidence that m&a
create e¢ ciency gains which seem to be distributed asymmetrically, though, as
e.g. McGuckin & Nguyen (1995) report. While recently acquired ￿rms experience
productivity improvements, the investor ￿rm￿ s plants su⁄er productivity losses,
making the net change for the investor ￿rm essentially zero.
Our main argument is the following. If investment abroad has some e⁄ect on the
performance of the investor company in the domestic country, then the marginal
return generated in the foreign location may di⁄er from the cost of capital. For
example, if domestic pro￿ts increase, then the marginal foreign investment may
even yield negative returns. Given this, taxes a⁄ect the selection of border crossing
investment projects which are carried out. If a potential host country increases its
taxes, it will deter projects which produce high pro￿ts in the host country (and
low pro￿ts or losses in the country where the parent company resides). At the
same time, this country will attract more projects which produce low pro￿ts or
losses in the host country and high pro￿ts in the country where the parent company
resides. As a result, the quantity of capital imports may increase, decline or remain
constant in response to the higher tax. But the quality of inbound investment in
the host country as measured by its contribution to the domestic pro￿t tax base
will unambiguously deteriorate. This is what we call the composition e⁄ect of
corporate taxation on cross-border investment.
The composition e⁄ect has some important implications. Firstly, the welfare
cost of tax distortions may be higher than suggested by studies focusing on the
quantity aspect alone. Secondly, as mentioned above, observed tax induced prof-
itability di⁄erences may not only be due to the shifting of book pro￿ts across
countries. Thirdly and more generally, policies which aim at attracting foreign
direct investment may have to pay more attention to the qualitative dimension of
this investment.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we present the model.
Section 3 discusses some extensions. In section 4, we provide suggestive evidence
for the main hypotheses. Section 5 concludes.
32 The model
In this section, the model setup is presented (2.1) before we derive tax e⁄ects on
investment quality (2.2). Then, tax rate e⁄ects on tax revenues are considered
(2.3). Finally, we ask for the optimal tax policy strategy and tax e⁄ects on welfare
(2.4).
2.1 Setup
The world consists of two countries, domestic and foreign. In the domestic country,
there is a representative household endowed with N units of capital. Moreover,
there are many identical ￿rms which have some ongoing production in the two
countries. These ￿rms consider investment projects in the foreign country. Cross-
border investment has two e⁄ects. Firstly, the project generates pro￿t income (or
losses) in the foreign investment location, denoted by ￿￿. Henceforth, the asterisk
denotes the location in the foreign country. Secondly, the pro￿t of the domestic
investor ￿rm generated in its country of residence changes by ￿.4
More formally, each domestic ￿rm i randomly draws a project and then decides
whether or not realize it. The project is characterized by a pair (￿i;￿￿
i) of pro￿t
changes at the investor￿ s and the investment location. ￿;￿￿ are two jointly dis-
tributed variables (￿;￿￿) 2 R2. For simplicity, we assume that the two variables
are uniformly distributed over the intervals ￿ 2 f￿￿;￿+g and ￿￿ 2 f￿￿￿;￿￿+g.
Each project requires one unit of capital which can be rented at a price of ￿ in the
world capital market.
Standard models virtually always assume that ￿ is equal to zero. It is the
main novelty of this model to allow for pro￿t level changes in the investor ￿rm, i.e.
we consider positive, negative or zero values of ￿. In other words, the investment
project may e⁄ectively increase or decrease pro￿ts of the parent company, or it
may not a⁄ect them at all. If ￿ < 0 , the transaction reduces the pro￿ts of the
parent company. A possible reason would be that the new subsidiary produces
a good which competes with products exported by the parent company. ￿ > 0,
4In the following, we will use the terms pro￿t and pro￿t changes equivalently. The term pro￿t
is more adequate if new production facilities are established, whereas pro￿t change is more exact
if existing production plants are modi￿ed, i.e. in the course of an acquisition or merger.
4i.e. an increase in pro￿ts of the parent company, may occur, for instance, if the
subsidiary owns technical knowledge or o⁄ers market access which is bene￿cial to
the parent company.
Thus, in the absence of taxes, the pro￿t of a border crossing investment project
is:
￿ + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ (1)
Denote by ￿￿c the marginal project for a given ￿. In equilibrium, each marginal
project will satisfy ￿ + ￿￿c = ￿:
Now, taxes are introduced. In our model, pro￿ts are subject to corporate in-
come taxes. Foreign source income is exempt from domestic tax, i.e. we assume
that international investment income is taxed according to the exemption system.
The nontax capital cost is not deductible, i.e. we assume equity ￿nancing. Pro-
jects are realized if posttax-pro￿ts, aggregated over the domestic and the foreign
location, are nonnegative, i.e. ￿(1 ￿ ￿)+￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿, where ￿ is the domestic
corporate tax rate and ￿￿ is the corporate tax rate of the foreign country. For each










Projects with ￿￿ < ￿￿c are not realized. The right hand side of (2) may be
interpreted as the cost of capital of foreign direct investment. The ￿rst term is
increasing in ￿ and the corporate tax rate of the country where the investment
is located. This e⁄ect is well known from standard tax models of international
investment. The second term on the right hand side of (2) is in the focus of this
paper. It re￿ ects that the new foreign investment project may a⁄ect the ongoing
activity of the multinational ￿rm in its country of residence. If ￿ > 0, the second
term reduces the cost of capital. The reason is that foreign investment increases the
pro￿ts of the parent company. Accordingly, ￿ < 0 implies that foreign investment
reduces domestic pro￿ts, so that the minimum foreign pro￿t required to make the
project worthwhile increases.
The foreign country has no capital endowment. It only imports capital and
5taxes pro￿ts generated by investment of multinational ￿rms. This asymmetry
assumption is made for the following reason. In this setup, investment of multina-
tional ￿rms in the foreign country is the only source of capital demand. Given that
the supply of capital is ￿xed, the quantity of capital exported from the domestic
country to the foreign country is given. This allows us to focus on the quality side
of capital ￿ ows. In section 3.1, we extend the model to allow for changes in both
the quality and the quantity of border crossing capital ￿ ows.
2.2 Tax rate e⁄ects on investment quality
Equation (2) shows that taxes may distort investment. In the standard model,
with ￿ = 0, the implications are clearcut. For ￿ > 0, it follows ￿￿c > ￿, i.e. the
return of the marginal unit of capital invested abroad is lower than the marginal
return in the absence of taxes. In contrast, if we allow for ￿ 6= 0, the picture may
change. For large and positive ￿, the minimum required project returns at the
investment location ￿￿c may become negative. This has important consequences
for the e⁄ect of corporate taxation on investment. Holding ￿ constant, a marginal










1 ￿ ￿￿ (3)
These expressions can be interpreted as follows. A positive sign of the derivative
means that a tax rate increase raises the required pro￿t of the foreign investment
project. In this case, higher taxes deter investment. Accordingly, negative values
represent cases where higher taxes increase investment. Now, consider the standard
case with ￿ = 0. In this case, it follows from equation (2) that ￿￿c > 0, i.e. the
pro￿t change in the foreign country caused by the marginal investment project
must be positive. In this case, higher foreign taxes deter investment (@￿￿c
@￿￿ ). ￿ = 0
also implies that domestic corporate taxes do not a⁄ect outbound investment, i.e.
@￿￿c
@￿ = 0.
This changes if we allow foreign investment to a⁄ect the pro￿ts of the domestic
parent company, i.e. ￿ 6= 0. If ￿ is positive and su¢ ciently large, the pro￿t change
at the investment location caused by the marginal project (￿￿c) becomes negative,
6i.e. ￿￿c < 0. In this case, the e⁄ect of corporate taxes on investment is reversed:
@￿￿c
@￿￿ < 0. In other words, higher foreign tax rates c.p. increase investment in
the foreign country. The reason is that the after tax cost of the decline in foreign
pro￿ts caused by the marginal investment project is smaller, the higher the tax
rate. The other interesting e⁄ect is that corporate taxes in the domestic country
may c.p. deter outbound investment. This also occurs if the pro￿t change at the
parent company location is positive: @￿￿c
@￿ = ￿
1￿￿￿ > 0.
So far, we have discussed the e⁄ects of tax changes in our model assuming that
the interest rate ￿ is constant. But of course, a variation in the tax rate will also















￿d￿ = N (5)
Since the supply of capital is ￿xed, ￿ will adjust to tax changes so that overall















￿cd￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿c (6)
where we have used
R ￿+
￿￿ d￿ = 1. ￿ ￿￿c can be interpreted as the average host
country pro￿t generated by the marginal projects (￿￿c). The total e⁄ect of a














￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
(7)
where ￿ ￿ ￿
R ￿+
￿￿ ￿d￿ is the average ￿. Equation (7) is of key importance for
our analysis. It has the following interpretation. Depending on the value of ￿ , ￿￿c
may be larger or smaller than ￿ ￿￿c. Consider ￿rst the ￿rms where ￿￿c > ￿ ￿￿c. These
are marginal projects where the pro￿t generated in the foreign country is above the
7average of all marginal projects. Accordingly, pro￿ts generated by these projects
in the domestic country are lower than on average
￿
￿ < ￿ ￿
￿
. These investment
projects will be crowded out by higher foreign taxes (d￿￿c
d￿￿ > 0). They will be
replaced by an expansion of projects which generate lower than average pro￿ts
in the foreign country
￿
￿￿c < ￿ ￿￿c￿
. This substitution of projects which generate
high foreign pro￿ts by projects which generate lower foreign pro￿ts or even losses
is what we refer to as the composition e⁄ect of corporate taxation on foreign direct
investment. While the mere quantity cannot change in our model, the quality of
foreign direct investment changes. If a country increases its tax rate, it attracts
fewer projects which generate local pro￿ts and more project which generate pro￿ts
somewhere else.









￿￿ ￿d￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. The e⁄ect of a small increase of the domestic corporate














￿c ￿ ￿ ￿
￿c￿
(8)
which can interpreted equivalently. Note that, again, the tax e⁄ect of foreign
taxes on foreign inbound investment would be zero in the standard model. The
reason is that the number of projects is ￿xed and does not change in response to
changes in ￿￿.
These results can be summarized as
Proposition 1 Composition e⁄ect: In the presence of feedback e⁄ects of foreign
investment on domestic performance, an increase in the corporate tax rate changes
the quality of investment projects. If the overall number of projects is ￿xed, an
increase in foreign taxes leads to a decline in investment in the foreign country
with above average foreign pro￿tability
￿
￿￿c > ￿ ￿￿c￿
and an increase in investment
with below average foreign pro￿tability
￿
￿￿c < ￿ ￿￿c￿
. An increase in the domestic
tax rate has the opposite e⁄ect.
Figure 1 illustrates the e⁄ects of corporate taxation on investment decisions














Figure 1: Tax e⁄ects on international investment.
The lines that separate the hatched area from the blank one show the locus
of marginal investment as a function of di⁄erent values for ￿ and ￿￿. Consider
￿rst the case without taxes, depicted on the left hand side of the ￿gure. At the
margin, ￿￿c = ￿ if ￿ = 0, and ￿ = ￿ if ￿￿c = 0. The slope of the curve is given
by d￿
d￿￿c = ￿1. All transactions above the line will be realized whereas possible
investment projects in the shaded area are rejected.
The graph in the center of ￿gure 1 illustrates the space of feasible investment
in the presence of taxes assuming ￿ > ￿￿. Note that, if both tax rates ￿ and ￿￿ are
equal, ￿ adjusts until all capital is employed. Then, the graph is the same as on the




1￿￿￿. For ￿ 6= ￿￿, though, the points
of intersection with the x- and the y-axis are shifted according to equation (2).
The slope of the marginal investment curve becomes steeper, d￿
d￿￿c = ￿1￿￿￿
1￿￿ < ￿1.
Corporate taxes now have two e⁄ects: The ￿rst is that projects are not realized any
more in the low-tax country that would have been in the absence of taxes (hatched
area above the no-tax-line). But, in addition, some projects are now realized that
would not have been without taxes (shaded area beneath the no-tax-line). These
projects are characterized by high positive pro￿t changes in the foreign country
and negative pro￿t changes in the domestic high-tax country. The graph on the
right hand side shows the case of ￿ < ￿￿. The slope of the marginal investment
line is ￿ atter now, d￿
d￿￿c > ￿1. There are some projects (high ￿￿, low ￿) which
are not realized anymore and some projects realized which were rejected in the
absence of taxes (low ￿￿, high ￿).
92.3 Tax rate e⁄ects on tax revenue
What are the e⁄ects of tax rate increases on tax revenue if the quality dimension
matters? Before we derive these e⁄ects in our model, recall the standard model.
An increase in corporate tax rates has essentially two e⁄ects. It increases revenue
by raising the tax burden for each project, and it decreases revenue by lowering the
number of projects carried out. These countervailing e⁄ects generate the typical
shape of the La⁄er-curve which has a maximum at the revenue-maximizing tax
rate. But if the number of projects is ￿xed, there is no countervailing e⁄ect in
the standard model, since there is no qualitative dimension, and the revenue-
maximizing tax rate would be ￿ = 100%.














where B￿ denotes the tax base. A small increase in the corporate tax rate ￿￿
has the following e⁄ect: dT ￿ = d￿￿B￿ + ￿￿dB￿ =
￿
B￿ + ￿￿ @B￿
@￿￿
￿
d￿￿ + ￿￿ @B￿
@￿ d￿ .




















￿c) < 0 (11)
where var(￿￿c) is the variance of ￿￿c.5 In the standard model, there is no
qualitative dimension of investment, and therefore var(￿￿c) = 0. In this model,
where var(￿￿c) > 0, an increase in the foreign tax rate decreases the foreign tax
base because of the composition e⁄ect, i.e. because the tax increase leads to a
substitution of investment projects with a high local pro￿tability by projects with
















Consider next the e⁄ect of an increase in the domestic tax rate on tax revenue





1 ￿ ￿￿cov (￿;￿
￿c) (13)
where cov (￿;￿￿c) is the covariance of ￿ and ￿￿c.6 Equation (2) implies that
the covariances are negative. Therefore, an increase in the domestic tax rate
increases foreign tax revenue: dT￿
d￿ > 0. In the same way, we can derive the e⁄ects






1 ￿ ￿￿var(￿) (14)




1 ￿ ￿￿cov (￿;￿
￿c): (15)
These results may be summarized as
Proposition 2 An increase in the foreign tax rate unambiguously reduces the for-
eign tax base and increases the domestic tax base (and vice versa), although the
number of projects remains constant.
The unambiguously negative e⁄ect of a tax increase on the domestic tax base
is due to the composition e⁄ect of corporate taxation. The tax increase encourages
investment projects which produce losses and discourages pro￿table projects.
This e⁄ect of investment on tax revenue is one of the empirically testable implic-
ations of our model. If our model actually explains part of real world investment
￿ ows then we should observe that high-tax countries have less gain from inbound





















11investment in terms of tax revenue than low-tax countries. In section 4, we test
this hypothesis empirically. We ￿nd that the higher the tax rate the lower is the
additional tax revenue per unit of foreign direct investment. Above a certain level
of the tax rate the contribution of FDI to tax revenues even becomes negative.
2.4 Optimal tax policy and welfare
In this section, we derive the optimal tax policy of the doemstic and the foreign
country. In both countries, the governments maximize the welfare of a repres-
entative household. Consider ￿rst the domestic country. The welfare of the do-
mestic household (W) is assumed to depend on private consumption C and publicly
provided goods G: W = W(C;G): To ease notation, we assume W = C + H (G).
Private consumption is given by the private return to investment





[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿
￿) ￿ ￿]d￿
￿d￿ (16)
Since the entire capital stock and all ￿rms belong to the domestic household






[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿
￿)]d￿
￿d￿ (17)
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1 ￿ ￿￿var(￿) (19)
The optimal tax policy involves the following tradeo⁄: The ￿rst term on the
right hand side of (19) re￿ ects that a higher tax rate shifts income from the do-
mestic household to the government. This increases welfare if the marginal util-
12ity from public consumption exceeds the marginal utility of private consumption
H0 ￿1 > 0. The second term is unambiguously negative if the tax rate is positive
and re￿ ects that a tax rate increase reduces the tax base. This trade-o⁄is familiar
from standard models of tax policy in models with capital mobility. The di⁄erence
is that the tax base e⁄ect results from a change in the quality of investment, ratehr
than the quantity.
How does an increase in the foreign tax rate a⁄ect domestic welfare? The

















1 ￿ ￿￿cov (￿;￿
￿c) (20)
The ￿rst term on the r.h.s. of (20) is negative and re￿ ects that an increase
in the foreign tax reduces the pro￿t income of domestic households.8 The second
term is unambiguously positive. It represents the positive ￿scal externality of a
foreign tax rate increase on domestic tax revenue. The overall welfare e⁄ect is
ambiguous.
The foreign country maximizes revenue from taxing ￿rms. It bene￿ts from an
increase in domestic taxes. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully analyze
tax competition in the presence of quality aspects of investment. However, it is
clear that the scope and the direction of potential coordination policies depends
on the ￿scal externalities mentioned above. The ￿scal externalities are similar to
those in the standard model.
3 Extension: Cross-border investment with qual-
ity and quantity dimensions
So far, we have assumed that the number of projects realized by domestic investors
in the foreign country is ￿xed. We now relax this assumption by introducing a
world capital market with an exogenously given interest rate of r. Firms may use
the rented capital to ￿nance cross-border investment projects. This implies that
8From the viewpoint of the foreign government, the domestic ownership of foreign assets may
imply the incentive to overtax corporate pro￿ts, see Huizinga & Nielsen (1997).
13the marginal project is de￿ned as yielding a return which equals the world interest
rate r:
￿
￿c (1 ￿ ￿
￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = r (21)










1 ￿ ￿￿ (22)
Aggregate investment, i.e. the overall number investment projects realized in









At a given interest rate in the world capital market, a marginal increase in the






@￿￿ d￿ = ￿
￿ ￿￿c
1 ￿ ￿￿ (24)
The tax e⁄ect on investment depends on an expression, ￿ ￿￿c =
R ￿
￿￿ ￿￿cd￿,
which can be interpreted as the mean marginal pro￿t generated by foreign invest-
ment in the foreign country. In the standard model, this expression is equal to
@K￿
@￿￿ = ￿ r
(1￿￿￿)2 since ￿ is assumed to be zero and therefore ￿￿c is equal to r
1￿￿￿.
In our model, though, the expression can be negative. In this case higher taxes
increase inbound investment, seen from the foreign government￿ s perspective. The
possibility that higher taxes may attract additional investment is due to the fact
that the value of losses is higher with high tax rates. If projects with negative mar-
ginal pro￿ts dominate, an increase in the corporate tax rate increases the value of
these projects and leads to an increase in total investment.
Thus, we may state that the qualitative aspects of investment may dominate the
quantitative side. In the case of
R ￿
￿￿ ￿￿cd￿ = 0, tax rate variations do not change
the number of projects at all (although the number of projects is endogenously
determined), but they have a composition e⁄ect, i.e. they change the qualitative
dimension of investment ￿ ows.
14What are the e⁄ects on tax revenue if we allow for the quantitative dimension













where B is the tax base. In the standard model, the e⁄ect of a small increase of
the corporate tax rate on the tax base is negative because higher tax rates reduce










Thus, although a higher tax may increase or decrease the foreign capital stock,
the e⁄ect of a higher foreign tax rate on the tax base is unambiguously negative.
The ￿rst term on the right hand side is the revenue increasing e⁄ect of increasing
the tax rate with a given tax base. The second term denotes the tax rate e⁄ect on
the tax base which is negative.
These results may be summarized as
Proposition 3 An increase in the foreign tax rate may increase or decrease ag-
gregate investment in the foreign country but always reduces the foreign corporate
income tax base.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we provide some suggestive evidence for the relevance of the com-
position e⁄ect of corporate taxation on FDI. It seems that, fortunately, there is
already a large number of papers which may be interpreted as providing evid-
ence for the existence of the composition e⁄ect and the qualitative dimension of
FDI. The empirical literature on tax e⁄ects on pro￿t shifting usually starts from
the observation that the returns per unit of capital (our ￿ and ￿) di⁄er between
domestic and foreign a¢ liates within a multinational company, and that the dif-
ference depends on the tax rate di⁄erential between the two jurisdictions. These
contributions implicitely assume that, besides pro￿t shifting, capital returns in
15the domestic and the foreign a¢ liate do not depend on each other. This is a
very strong assumption. If foreign investment projects have feedback e⁄ects on
domestic pro￿ts, then the observed e⁄ects may arise even in the absence of pro￿t
shifting.
If investment has a qualitative dimension, high tax countries will be more likely
than low tax countries to attract investment projects which lead to low or zero
tax payments (or even negative tax payments when the losses can be set against
other income). In the following, we therefore measure the impact of FDI on tax
revenue. The above presented model predicts that high-tax countries will attract
FDI that increases their tax revenues less than FDI in low-tax countries does. We
will estimate an equation of the following form:
Tax base = ￿0 +￿1Tax rate+￿2FDI +￿3FDI ￿Tax rate+
X
￿jX +" (27)
If there is a composition e⁄ect on FDI, a higher tax rate will lower the increase
in tax revenue per unit of incoming FDI or even decrease it in absolute terms.
That means that the model predicts a negative estimated coe¢ cient ￿3. Note that
in the standard model taxes decrease the quantity of FDI. But when the quantity
is controlled for, there is no prediction for the sign or the size of ￿3. Note further
that the model yields symmetric predictions for inbound and outbound FDI. Both
directions of investment should have a negative estimate of ￿3.
Table 1 shows the summary statistic of the main variables used for estimation.
It reports the number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation and the
median value.
Table 1: Summary statistic
No. obs. Mean St.dev. Median
EATR 468 0.3052 0.0685 0.2800
Tax rate 479 0.4082 0.0924 0.3900
Tax revenue 388 0.0302 0.0144 0.0285
Tax base 368 0.0802 0.0734 0.0441
Corporate VA 235 0.5534 0.0796 0.5639
Gross operating surplus 304 0.1981 0.0358 0.2003
Inbound FDI 398 0.1859 0.1696 0.1413
Outbound FDI 392 0.2432 0.3060 0.1444
GDP 405 1,154,263 1,924,153 373,573
Note: Data sources are given in the text.
All numbers represent shares of GDP except for tax rates and GDP itself. The
16EATR and the (statutory) tax rates are taken from the IFS corporate tax database
described in Devereux, Gri¢ th & Klemm (2002). For countries not included in the
IFS database we added tax rates from KPMG (2006). The tax revenue ￿gures are
taken from the OECD database, as well as the share of corporate value added and
the gross operating surplus. The tax base is calculated by dividing tax revenues
through statutory tax rates. Since this is no perfect measure, we run regression
for both tax bases and revenues. Inbound and outbound FDI are provided by
UNCTAD. It would be useful to have FDI-weighted investor country tax rates.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the share of FDI for which we have tax rate data
is too low to construct reliable indicators. Therefore, our estimations are based on
the assumption that the host tax rates are a good measure for the (relative) tax
burden. This is necessarily true in the aggregate but it may generate biases for
individual countries.
Table 1 reports the results of ￿ve di⁄erent estimation speci￿cations. All spe-
ci￿cations use host country ￿xed e⁄ects and year ￿xed e⁄ects. In column 1, regres-
sion results of equation (27) are presented with the FDI term split in inbound and
outbound FDI stocks. As expected, the gross operating surplus has high predictive
power for the size of the tax base. The inbound and outbound terms are not sig-
ni￿cant. However, their coe¢ cients show the same signs and the same structure.
Whereas inbound and outbound FDI have a positive coe¢ cient, the interaction
terms are negative. Since both inbound and outboud FDI are highly correlated
the lack of signi￿cance is potentially due to collinearity. Since our model yields
symmetric predictions for both directions of FDI, i.e. both incoming and outgoing
FDI are supposed to have negative interaction terms with the EATR (or other tax
indicator), we go on by using total FDI which is the sum of the two variables.
17Table 2: Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EATR EATR EATR EATR Stat. tax rate EATR Stat. tax rate
EATR 0.0872 0.0841 0.2718 0.1865 0.0291
(0.0659) (0.0617) (0.2403) (0.1924) (0.0868)
Statutory tax rate 0.5511 0.1595
(0.1659)** (0.0545)**
Corporate VA -0.2479 -0.2619 -0.0305 0.0041 -0.0827 -0.0363
(0.1883) (0.1593) (0.1597) (0.1560) (0.0526) (0.0541)
Corp VA x TR -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
Gross operating 0.8913 0.9336 1.2679 1.0510 1.6395 0.2238 0.3898
    surplus (0.1795)** (0.1321)** (0.3146)** (0.2827)** (0.3168)** (0.1060)* (0.0966)**
GOS x TR -1.5318 -1.2175 -2.4204 0.2917 -0.3233
(0.9854) (0.9308) (0.7098)** (0.3599) (0.2356)
Inbound FDI 0.2571
(0.2215) Total FDI 0.2474 0.1930 0.1859 0.1724 0.0532 0.0453
Inbound FDI -0.9970 (0.0466)** (0.0451)** (0.0416)** (0.0423)** (0.0138)** (0.0127)**
    x TR (0.8369)
Outbound FDI 0.1599 Total FDI -0.8159 -0.6275 -0.6106 -0.4787 -0.1795 -0.1239
(0.1596) x TR (0.1726)** (0.1636)** (0.1515)** (0.1213)** (0.0515)** (0.0384)**
Outbound FDI -0.4401
     x TR (0.6538)
GDP 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)**
GDP x TR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)*
Constant 0.0199 0.0180 -0.1466 -0.1230 -0.2741 0.0115 -0.0601
(0.0883) (0.0820) (0.1095) (0.0598)* (0.1117)* (0.0361) (0.0364)
Observations 215 215 215 283 226 215 226
No. of countries 15 15 15 18 16 15 16
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.63 0.64
Tax base Tax revenue
Notes: Dependent variables are tax base (columns 1-5) and tax revenue (columns 6 and 7), both measured as a fraction of GDP. All
specifications use year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Corporate value
added, gross operating surplus and FDI are measured as a fraction of GDP as well. TR stands for EATR or the statutory tax rate, respectively;
see column headline.
And, indeed, using the sum of FDI instead of inbound and outbound FDI
separately yields signi￿cant coe¢ cient estimates for the FDI term which similar
properties compared to the estimations reported in column 1. The coe¢ cients
have the expected signs: In general, foreign direct investment increases the tax
base. However, high-tax countries gain less tax base or even lose some fraction
of the tax base. The control variables remain virtually the same and also the
R-squared does not decrease.
It may be that the coe¢ cient estimates for the FDI terms are artefacts if high-
tax countries di⁄er systematically from low-tax countries with regard to other
variables. In column 3, we therefore add interaction terms with the EATR for the
18control variables. The FDI coe¢ cients are slightly decreased but remain strongly
signi￿cant.
How should the results be interpreted? The estimation reported in column 3
suggests that a marginal increase in FDI has the following e⁄ect on the tax base
@ (Tax base=GDP)
@ (FDI=GDP)
= 0:1930 ￿ 0:6275 ￿ EATR
This means that FDI does not add anything to the tax base and even reduces
it above a tax rate of 30%. Whereas Germany is predicted to lose tax base on
average with its EATR tax rates of 0.32 (in 2005), the UK and France gain with
tax rates at 0.24 and 0.25. The US (0.29) taxbase is virtually una⁄ected by FDI.
Columns 4 to 7 include some robustness checks. In column 4, we repeat the
regression without the corporate value added of which we only have data for a
limited number of countries and periods. The number of observations is increased
to 283. The results remain stable, though. In column 4 we use the statutory tax
rate as a control variable and as interaction variable. The results are qualitatively
the same; the statutory tax rate at which the contribution of FDI to the tax base
becomes zero is equal to 36%. Germany and the USA are above this level, the UK
and France are beneath.
In columns 6 and 7, tax revenues are used as a dependent variable and are re-
gressed, and the tax variable is the EATR and the statutory tax rate, respectively.
The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. The tax indicators
at which FDI does not contribute to tax revenues anymore is 29:6% and 36:6%,
respectively.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to relax the assumption that foreign direct
investment of multinational ￿rms only a⁄ects pro￿ts at the investment location
itself. We introduce investment projects that yield pro￿t changes at the investment
and the investor￿ s location. Therefore, the marginal pro￿t level at the investment
location does not need to be equal to the cost of capital as de￿ned in the usual
way. Depending on the pro￿t change at the investor￿ s location, it can be higher or
19lower.
Our analysis implies that there is a dimension of capital ￿ ows which is largely
neglected by the standard model: the quality dimension. With negative local
pro￿ts generated by marginal projects, higher inbound investment may reduce the
domestic tax base. This is con￿rmed by the evidence presented in this paper.
Using aggregate investment and tax revenue data, we ￿nd that, on average, high-
tax countries lose tax revenue in response to incoming FDI while low-tax countries
gain tax revenue. We calculate a break-even e⁄ective average tax rate of 30 per
cent at which the contribution of an additional unit of FDI has a zero impact on
tax revenues. Above this rate, incoming FDI decreases tax revenues.
The idea that higher taxes reduce the tax base is familiar from studies on tax
induced pro￿t shifting. These studies argue that ￿rms react to international tax
di⁄erences by shifting book pro￿ts from high tax countries to low tax countries by
means of transfer pricing or intra ￿rm debt contracts, so that reported pro￿ts are
lower in high tax countries. Our theory, in contrast, explains these di⁄erences as a
result of tax induced project selection. This does not stand in direct opposition to
the pro￿t shifting story, it rather o⁄ers a complementary explanation. However,
accounting for project selection, as opposed to pro￿t shifting, may have important
consequences for empirical estimations on the one hand and policy recommenda-
tions on the other hand.
Firstly, a large part of the empirical literature on pro￿t shifting starts from the
observation that pro￿tability is higher in low-tax a¢ liates than in high-tax a¢ l-
iates. These tax-related di⁄erences are interpreted as a result of pro￿t shifting,
see e.g. Grubert & Mutti (1991), Hines & Rice (1994), Huizinga & Laeven (2007)
and Weichenrieder (2007). Accounting for project selection as an alternative ex-
planation suggests that associating all tax-related pro￿tability di⁄erences solely
with pro￿t shifting activities will overestimate its importance. Project selection
therefore is a possible explanation for the puzzle that international pro￿t shift-
ing is large when measured through cross-country pro￿tability di⁄erences, as in
Huizinga & Laeven (2007), but small when the use of pro￿t shifting instruments is
considered. E.g., Laeven, NicodŁme & Huizinga (2007) and Buettner & Wamser
(2007) show that taxes only have a small impact on the use of intra-￿rm loans,
and tax practitioners report that the use of transfer pricing is substantially limited
20by legal provisions of the high-tax countries.
Clearly, the empirical analysis presented in the paper does not provide evidence
in favour of project selection as opposed to pro￿t shifting. Even though it would
be highly desirable, it seems hard to test empirically which part of the tax driven
pro￿tability di⁄erences is due to pro￿t shifting and which part is explained by real
economic e⁄ects.
Secondly, when it comes to policy implications, it is important to know whether
pro￿tability di⁄erences are due to pro￿t shifting or project selection. If we inter-
pret all tax induced pro￿tability di⁄erences as a result of pro￿t shifting, it is
natural to conclude that anti tax avoidance measures like e.g. transfer pricing
documentation requirements or thin capitalization rules may increase corporate
tax revenues. But if the composition e⁄ect partly explains these di⁄erences, the
revenue raising potential of measures directed against the shifting of book pro￿ts
is overestimated. Given that these policies may imply substantial costs and dis-
tortions of ￿rm behavior, a misinterpretation of the data may lead to unnecessary
welfare losses.
Another important implication of our analysis is that, if marginal pro￿ts are
allowed to be negative, then the e⁄ects of tax changes on the quantity of investment
can be reversed: Higher taxes may attract more investment, lower taxes may deter
investment. From 1990 to 2000, Germany increased its stock of foreign held capital
by about 520% (source: OECD) and performed much better in attracting foreign
FDI than the UK (115%), France (205%), the US (180%) or Japan (410%). The
standard way of reading these ￿gures is that Germany attracted FDI despite its
relatively high tax rates (before the tax reform in 2001, the corporate tax rates in
Germany were between 52% and 58% and thus among the highest throughout the
developed world). Our model provides an argument for a di⁄erent interpretation:
It could be that Germany attracted as much FDI because of its high tax rates.
A broader issue raised by our analysis is that, from the perspective of a host
country, not every kind of inbound FDI is desirable. The quality dimension em-
phasized in our model suggests that there might be ￿good￿ types of inbound
investment projects (those which increase production, employment and tax pay-
ments) and ￿bad￿types (those which decrease activity and tax payments). Our
model thus makes a ￿rst step towards providing a rationale for the skepticism to-
21wards certain types of foreign inbound investment which has always been present
in the public debate.
Our model shows that more inbound investment can lead to smaller domestic
tax bases. This may explain why inbound investment - especially in the form
of m&a - is often regarded as not very attractive from the public point of view.
But our model also shows that high taxes attract this kind of harmful investment
projects. Thus, if our model captures some aspects of the real world, then tax
policy makers should not promise more investment in￿ ows in response to a possible
tax cut but di⁄erent investment in￿ ows.
6 Appendix
This appendix derives equations (19) and (20). The partial derivative of welfare





















where we have used @￿￿c
@￿ = ￿
1￿￿￿. Taking the change in the price of capital into
account, the total tax e⁄ect is dW
d￿ = W￿ +W￿￿￿. Where as ￿￿ is given in the text
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where we used @￿￿c
@￿￿ = ￿￿c
1￿￿￿. Again, the total tax e⁄ect is equal to dW
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